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POST-KIOBEL PROCEDURE.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
OR PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION?
Anthony J. Colangelo*& ChristopherR. Knightt

ABSTRACT
This Essay evaluates whether Alien Tort Statute (ATS) cases involving
foreign elements raise questions of prescriptive jurisdiction or subject
matter jurisdiction after the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum. It concludes that the lower court trend treats Kiobel as
going to subject matterjurisdiction,and that this trend is probably correct.
It would have been helpful for the Supreme Court to clearly provide
guidance on this question-which has major doctrinal and procedural
consequences for the law and litigants. The procedural implications of
viewing challenges based on Kiobel as going to judicial subject matter
jurisdiction are that such challenges can be raised at any time during the
course of litigation, including by the court sua sponte. The doctrinal
implications are that when evaluating whether Kiobel's exception for
"claims that touch and concern the territory of the United States.... with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application," courts should look not only to whether the conduct alleged
touches and concerns the United States, but instead, as some lower courts
have found, to "all the facts that give rise to A TS claims, including the
parties' identities and their relationshipto the causes of action."
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INTRODUCTION

This Essay evaluates how lower courts are presently viewing objections
to Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims involving foreign elements after the
Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, which
applied a species of presumption against extraterritoriality to ATS claims
arising abroad. More specifically, we ask whether challenges based on
Kiobel go to a court's subject matter jurisdiction to entertain claims arising
abroad or instead to US prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate the foreign
conduct alleged, and thus the merits of the case. This is an issue that has
largely been analytically ignored by courts and scholars, yet it has created a
fractured lower-court jurisprudence and holds immense procedural and
doctrinal consequences for litigants and the development of the law.
The legal concept of jurisdiction is not monolithic; rather, it is made up
of different forms that describe different assertions and applications of legal
power. Moreover, different legal doctrines attend different forms of
jurisdiction, making identification of the correct form or forms of
jurisdiction at issue in a dispute critical both doctrinally and procedurally to
the resolution of that dispute. Of central importance to this Essay is the
difference between what courts, including the US Supreme Court, refer to as
"prescriptive jurisdiction," or jurisdiction to prescribe rules that regulate
conduct, and adjudicative "subject2 matter jurisdiction," or the jurisdiction of
courts to entertain certain claims.
As the very articulation of this distinction should begin to make clear,
how one answers the jurisdictional question can have profound effects on
how one treats post-Kiobel cases that have foreign elements, in light of the
Supreme Court's statement at the end of its opinion that: "On these facts, all
the relevant conduct took place outside the United States. And even where
the claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they must do
'

133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).

2

Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875-77 (2010); Hartford Fire Ins.

Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application." 3 On the one hand, if the relevant type of jurisdiction is
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate foreign conduct, the appropriate focus
would seem to be on the location of the conduct underlying the suit-as
suggested by the first sentence of the Kiobel quotation. As a procedural
matter, the objection therefore must be raised early in the litigation or else it
is waived. 4 If, on the other hand, the relevant type of jurisdiction is the
court's subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising abroad, the appropriate
focus would seem to be whether the claims "touch and concern the territory
of the United States"-as suggested by the second sentence of the Kiobel
quotation.
This latter inquiry conceivably opens up the analysis to
encompass not just the conduct at issue, but also other features of the claim
that might touch the United States, including, for example, the nationality of
the parties. As a procedural matter, this objection can be raised any timeindeed, it can be raised by the court sua sponte at any stage in the
litigation-and is not subject to waiver. In short, whether courts treat Kiobel
as going to prescriptive jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction can have
major consequences for both the doctrinal development of the law and the
procedures parties must use to litigate ATS claims.
Part I of the Essay describes the twists and turns of a meandering
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the difference between prescriptive
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction in cases with foreign elements-a
jurisprudence that ends with Kiobel's strange failure to say whether the
defect before it was one of prescriptive or subject matter jurisdiction.
Part II assesses lower court case law since Kiobel. It explains that most
courts have treated Kiobel as going to the court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Yet at least one court has explicitly held the opposite, viewing arguments
based on Kiobel as going to the merits and therefore waived because they
were not timely raised. Other courts have made oblique overtures in this
direction as well. Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of this lower court
jurisprudence, however, is the remarkable failure of any court to provide
sustained analysis of why it viewed the jurisdictional issue as one of either
prescriptive or subject matter jurisdiction. Both sides of the issue appear to
merely assume they are correct without analysis.
Part III of the Essay seeks to fill this gap and provide some analysis. It
suggests that the lower court trend of treating the issue as one of subject

3

Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (2013) (internal citation omitted).
See Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
20, 2013).
4
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matter jurisdiction is probably correct in light of the ATS's "strictly
jurisdictional nature" and the notable absence of conduct-regulating rules in
the statute, even if that interpretation renders the law incoherent in light of
the Supreme Court's other recent extraterritoriality decision, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank.5
Part III then continues by exploring the
procedural and doctrinal implications of this classification. To wit, because
subject matter jurisdiction inquiries may consider not only the conduct
alleged but also all of the components comprising a claim-including the
nationalities of the parties-the key post-Kiobel inquiry is whether "the
claims touch and concern the territory of the United States,. . . with
sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application.

I. PRESCRIPTIVE JURISDICTION VERSUS SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
Judicial treatment of what type of jurisdiction the presumption against
extraterritoriality operates on is messy and inconsistent. Confusion on this
question can be traced to the Supreme Court's opinion in Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. v. California,where the Court evaluated whether the Sherman
Antitrust Act reached foreign conduct as a question of the district court's
subject matter jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia rejected this view in dissent,
explaining that "the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act ... has nothing
to do with the jurisdiction of the courts. It is a question of substantive law
turning on whether, in enacting the Sherman Act, Congress asserted
regulatory power over the challenged conduct. ' 8 Justice Scalia noted that
"[t]here is, however, a type of 'jurisdiction' relevant to determining the
extraterritorial reach of a statute; it is known as 'legislative jurisdiction,' or
'jurisdiction to prescribe." 9
He clarified that prescriptive jurisdiction
"refers to 'the authority of a state to make its law applicable to persons or
' 10
activities,' and is quite a separate matter from 'jurisdiction to adjudicate." '
In Justice Scalia's view, the proper inquiry in HartfordFire was not whether
courts should decide to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over claims

'

130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
7 See HartfordFire, 509 U.S. 764 at 798-99.
8 Id. at 813 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
6

9 Id. (internal citations omitted).
0 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
STATES pt. IV, intro, note (1987)).

OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
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arising out of foreign conduct, but rather whether Congress intended the
Sherman Act's substantive, conduct-regulating rules to reach that foreign
conduct." To resolve this question,
Justice Scalia employed longstanding
S12
canons of statutory construction to conclude that Congress did not so
intend.
The Court later reversed course in Morrison v. NationalAustralia Bank,
a case involving claims by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants for
fraud in connection with stock purchased on a foreign exchange.13 At issue
was if, and how, a statutory presumption against extraterritorial application
attached to the US Securities Exchange Act. 14 Justice Scalia began the
Court's opinion in Morrison with a section devoted entirely to "correct[ing]
a threshold error in the Second Circuit's analysis."' 15 According to the Court
in Morrison, the lower court had mistakenly "considered the extraterritorial
reach of § 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] to raise a question of subject-matter
jurisdiction .... ,,16 The Court corrected this error: "But to ask what conduct
§ 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits
question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, 'refers to a tribunal's
power to hear a case ..
,,,17 After distinguishing the extraterritorial reach
of § 10(b)'s prescriptive conduct-regulating rule prohibiting fraud as "an
issue quite separate" from the subject matter jurisdiction of US courts, the
Court observed that as to the latter, under the Exchange Act "[tlhe District
Court here had jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa to adjudicate the question
whether § 10(b) applies to [the defendant's] conduct," 18 and quoted the
relevant language of § 78aa, which provides:
The district courts of the United States ... shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of violations of [the Exchange Act] or the rules and
regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law

11 See id at 813-21.
12 Seeid. at814-15.

13 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875-76 (2010).

See id. at 2877-78.
Id. at 2876-77.
6 Id. at 2877.

1

IS

17 Id. (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs & Trainmen Gen.
Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 558 U.S. 67, 81 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
18 Id. (footnote omitted).

19 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 49 (2015)

54

by [the Exchange
brought to enforce any liability or duty created
19
thereunder.
regulations
and
rules
the
or
Act]
Under Morrison, therefore, the extraterritorial reach of a statute is a
question of prescriptive, not judicial subject matter, jurisdiction. It followed
that whether and how a presumption against extraterritoriality applied
concerned a statute's conduct-regulating rules, not its subject matter
jurisdiction provisions for courts. Indeed, even where the plaintiff, the
defendant, and the transaction were foreign, the Court stressed that judicial
subject matter jurisdiction existed under the Exchange Act's jurisdictional
provisions.
But then the course of the Court's jurisprudence seemed to change yet
20
again, or at least became somewhat muddled, three years later in Kiobel.
At issue was "whether and under what circumstances courts may recognize a
cause of action under the Alien Tort Statute [ATS], for violations of the law
of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other than the United
States."'21 The ATS grants US district courts "original jurisdiction of any
civil action by' an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
As the statutory language indicates-and as the Court in
nations ....
jurisdictional.' It does not
Kiobel acknowledged-the ATS is "'strictly
23
directly regulate conduct or afford relief."
Kiobel involved ATS claims by Nigerian plaintiffs against British,
Dutch, and Nigerian corporate defendants alleging harmful conduct in
Nigeria. 24 Like Morrision, Kiobel therefore was a "foreign-cubed" case.
Under Morrison, the result should have been clear: because the ATS is
"strictly jurisdictional" and "does not directly regulate conduct," 25 a
presumption against extraterritoriality is inapplicable. That is, like §78aa of
the Exchange Act, the ATS goes to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction;
both §78aa and the ATS simply authorize US courts with "jurisdiction."
Under the ATS, that "jurisdiction" encompasses "any civil action by an alien
,26 If the
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations .

19 Id. at 2877 n.3 (alteration in original) (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78aa).
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
21 Id. at 1662.
20

22 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
23

133 S. Ct. at 1664 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542

U.S. 692, 732 (2004)).
24 Id. at 1662-63.
25 Id. at 1664.
26 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
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ATS does not sufficiently indicate extraterritorial application, certainly
neither does § 78aa. And if the district court in Morrison "had jurisdiction
under 15 U.S.C. § 78aa" 27 over claims involving extraterritorial activity-as
the Supreme Court explicitly said it did-then the district court in Kiobel
also should have had jurisdiction under the ATS over claims involving
extraterritorial activity.
The Supreme Court nonetheless applied the presumption, or at least
some variation thereof, for the Court did not appear to apply the presumption
directly to the ATS proper. Rather, the Court seized upon the cause of
action allowed by the ATS. 28 This was an odd choice since the presumption
against extraterritoriality is a canon of statutory construction. Yet we have
already seen that applying the presumption directly to the ATS itself would
be awkward, because the ATS, like § 78aa of the Exchange Act, is a
jurisdictional statute. And in fact, the Court did not quite do that; instead, it
tried to stretch the presumption around, or perhaps through, the statute itself
in order to reach the common law cause of action the statute implicitly
authorized. Such a strained use of the presumption is odd. It is also not very
convincing. For no matter what type of leapfrogging around the Court had
in mind for the presumption, it was invariably mired in the text and context
of the ATS. Thus, although the Court strained to cabin the presumption's
work "to claims under the ATS," it invariably asked about the statute itself,
concluding that "nothing in the [ATS] rebuts that presumption." 2 9 And once
that statutory inquiry is made, no principled distinction exists between
gauging the presumption's applicability to the ATS on the one hand, and its
applicability to §78aa on the other. In this regard, Kiobel renders the law
incoherent.
The pressing question for lower courts and litigants after Kiobel is
whether the presumption against extraterritoriality, or at least its logic,
applies to ATS cases as a matter of prescriptive or subject matter
jurisdiction. There are some clues in Kiobel itself indicating that the
question is one of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition to the Court
acknowledging the ATS's "strictly jurisdictional" nature, 30 Justice Kennedy
raised the extraterritoriality issue sua sponte at oral argument 31-a clear sign

27 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
28

See id. at 1664-65.

Id. at 1669.
'0 Id. at 1664.
29

31

Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct.

1659 (2013) (No. 10-1491).
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of a subject-matter jurisdiction, 32 as opposed to a merits-based, defect. As
we will see in Part II, the lower court trend so far appears to be in favor of
classifying the defect as going to subject matter jurisdiction, and indeed
courts have felt free to raise it sua sponte for this reason. 33 There are,
however, exceptions, with at least one court clearly viewing the
presumption's operation on the ATS 34as a prescriptive, merits-based
challenge that can be-and was-waived.
II. LOWER COURT APPLICATION POST-KOBEL

As noted, most lower courts applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to the ATS in Kiobel's wake have taken the Supreme
Court's holding to require that such application be characterized and treated
as a subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a prescriptive jurisdiction,
question.
But not all courts have followed this trend; a minority of courts

32

See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

33 See Chen Gang v. Zhao Zhizhen, No. 3:04CV 1146 RNC, 2013 WL 5313411, at
*4 (D.

Conn. Sept. 20, 2013); Kaplan v. Cent. Bank, No. 10-483, 2013 WL 4427943, at *15-16
(D.D.C. Aug. 20, 2013); Ahmed v. Comm'r for Educ. Lagos State, No. 1:13-cv-00050-MPGRJ, 2013 WL 4001194, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2013); Ahmed-al-Khalifa v. Minister of
Interior, No.5:13-cv-172-RS-GRJ, 2013 WL 3991961, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2013); Chen
v. Shi, No. 09 Civ. 8920, 2013 WL 3963735, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2013); Ahmed-alKhalifa v. Obama, No. 1:13-cv-49-MW/GRJ, 2013 WL 3797287, at *1-2 (N.D. Fla. July 19,
2013); Al Shimari v. Caci Int'l, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 857, 857 (E.D. Va. 2013); Mwangi v.
Bush, No. 5:12-373-KKC, 2013 WL 3155018, at *4 (E.D. Ky. June 18, 2013); Ahmed-alKhalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 3:13cv289-WS, 2013 WL 2432947, at *2-3 (N.D. Fla. June
3, 2013); Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 68-71 (D.D.C. 2013);
Mwani v. Bin Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1,_ (D.D.C. 2013); Muntslag v. D'Ieteren, S.A., No.
12-cv-07038, 2013 WL 2150686, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013).
34 See Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-cv-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *1-2 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
20, 2013).
35 See, e.g., Mohammadi v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 947 F. Supp. 2d 48, 70-71 (D.D.C. 2013),
reconsiderationdenied (July 12, 2013); Muntslag, 2013 WL 2150686, at *2 v.; Ahmed-AIKhalifa v. Salvation Army, No. 3:I3cv28913CV289-WS, 2013 WL 2432947, at *3 (N.D. Fla.
June 3, 2013), appeal dismissed (Dec. 13, 2013); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech.,
Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 530 (4th Cir. 2014) (vacating the district court's dismissal for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction after finding "that the plaintiffs' Alien Tort Statute (ATS) claims
'touch and concern' the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption"); Ben-Haim v. Neeman, 543 F. App'x 152, 154-55 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that
"the conduct that formed the basis of the ATS claim took place [abroad], and thus subject
matter jurisdiction ... is lacking in the federal courts"); Mwani v. Laden, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5
(D.D.C. 2013) (finding that the presumption was displaced and that "[s]ubject matter
jurisdiction [was] therefore proper").
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appears to have treated the application of the presumption to the ATS as
a
36
merits question, thereby indicating that it goes to prescriptive jurisdiction.
While most courts have treated the application of the presumption to the
ATS as a subject matter jurisdiction question, there is remarkably little, if
any, discussion as to the rationale for such treatment. Indeed, many courts
have simply assumed that Kiobel's presumption goes to the court's subject
matter jurisdiction rather than to the jurisdiction to prescribe and regulate
foreign conduct. 37 For instance, Muntslag v. D'Ieteren-the first case to
apply the presumption to the ATS after Kiobel-simply noted that "the
Supreme Court recently.., held that the ATS does not provide the federal
courts of the United States with subject matter jurisdiction over torts that
occur outside of the United States." 8 Thus, because the conduct alleged
"clearly occurred overseas," the court found it was "not necessary to address
the questionable proposition that the conduct [the plaintiff] allege[d] violated
the 'law of nations or a treaty of the United States."' 39 Other courts have
followed Muntslag's lead, or at least have made a similar assumption. For
instance, in Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., the Fourth Circuit
framed the ATS question before it in light of Kiobel as "whether a federal
district court has subject matter jurisdiction to consider certain civil claims
seeking damages against an American corporation for the torture and
40
mistreatment of foreign nationals at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq."
Another court remarked, "the Supreme Court appears to have set a very high
bar for plaintiffs assertingjurisdiction under the ATS for claims arising out
of conduct occurring entirely abroad." 4 1 Similarly, in Ahmed-Al-Khalifa v.
Salvation Army, the court explicitly treated Kiobel as going to the court's
subject matter jurisdiction:
In light of Kiobel, the ATS cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction
upon Plaintiffs claims, because the relevant conduct and alleged

36

See, e.g., Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *6-7

(S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2013) on reconsideration,994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014); Ahmed
v. Magan, No. 2:10-CV-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at * (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20, 2013) report cnd
recommendation adopted, No. 2:10-CV-00342, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013);
Giraldo v. Drummond Co., No. 2:09-cv-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *8 (N.D. Ala. July
25, 2013).
37 See, e.g., Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 70-71; Muntslag, 2013 WL 2150686, at *2;
Ahmed-Al-Khalifa, 2013 WL 2432947, at *3.
38 Muntslag, 2013 WL 2150686, at *2.
39 Id.
40 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., 758 F.3d at 522.
41
Mohammadi, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (emphasis added).
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violations occurred outside the United States, and the allegedly
unlawful [conduct] does not 'touch' or concern' the United States in
such a way that 42
would overcome the ATS's presumption against
extraterritoriality.
The Second Circuit seems to have adopted a subject matter view of the
issue as well. In Balintulo v. DaimlerAG, the Second Circuit read Kiobel as
holding that "federal courts may not, under the ATS, recognize common-law
causes of action for conduct occurring in the territory of another
sovereign. ,,43
Yet not all courts have made this assumption. A minority of courts has,
or has seemingly, treated the issue as a merits question-which indicates, in
line with Morrison, that the extraterritorial scope of the statute goes to
prescriptive jurisdiction rather than subject matter jurisdiction. However, as
with courts that have treated the issue as one of subject matter jurisdiction,
analysis is lacking: courts treating the application of the presumption to the
ATS as a merits question seem to merely assume such treatment is proper.
In Ahmed v. Magan, for example, the plaintiff argued that Kiobel was "not a
decision about subject matter jurisdiction but about what types of claims
may be pleaded under the statute."' 44 The court, apparently in agreement,
found that because the "[d]efendant did not move to dismiss for failure to
state a claim ...[or] oppose summary judgment[,J ... [a]ny merits argument

he might have had [was] waived." 45 Unfortunately for coherency's sake, the
46
Magan court did not delve deeper.
Although Magan appears to be the only court so far to explicitly find
waiver in line with a prescriptive jurisdiction view of the issue, a few other
courts have alluded to this view but have stopped short of actually discussing
waiver. In Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, for example, the court granted
summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' ATS claims rather than
dismissing them for want of jurisdiction-possibly suggesting, but not
42 Ahmed-Al-Khalifa, 2013 WL 2432947, at *3.
43 727 F.3d 174, 184 (2d Cir. 2013).

44 Ahmed v. Magan, No. 2:10-CV-00342, 2013 WL 4479077, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 20,
2013), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 5493032 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2013).
45

id.
46 After finding "that defendant ha[d] waived any merits argument he may have raised
based on the Kiobel decision," the court also noted that, regardless, "the presumption against

extraterritoriality has been overcome in this case." Thus, although the court did find waiver,
evidencing that it treated the issue as a merits question, it also provided an alternate holdingthat the presumption had been overcome-to ensure that jurisdiction was proper nonetheless.
See id. at *2.
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openly confirming, that the court was treating the issue as a merits
question. 47 Likewise, the court in Giraldo v. Drummond Co. found that,
after excluding inadmissible Rule 56 evidence, there was nothing left to
support plaintiffs' ATS claims and thus granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment. 4 8 While these decisions do not clearly decide the issue
one way or another, their failure to frame, let alone even mention, the issue
of subject matter jurisdiction at least evinces an unawareness of the different
jurisdictional analyses at play.
In sum, most courts have treated the application of the presumption to
the ATS as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, while a few courts seem to
have treated it as a merits question of prescriptive jurisdiction. However,
nearly every court to address the issue has failed to articulate in any detail its
reason for treating the issue as either a prescriptive jurisdiction or a subject
matter jurisdiction question. Despite Kiobel's opacity on this point, and the
apparent split in application, courts appear to simply assume that the
question is not really in dispute. In turn, reasoned opinions-ones that can
guide litigants and courts going forward-are notably absent.

III. ANALYSIS

AND IMPLICATIONS

The most persuasive argument in favor of subject matter jurisdiction is
that the ATS is a "jurisdictional" statute; it contains no conduct-regulating
rules. As the Supreme Court explained in Kiobel, the ATS is "'strictly
' 9
jurisdictional.' It does not directly regulate conduct or afford relief.'
Indeed, invoking subject matter jurisdiction language, the Court previously
explained in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS is a statute that addresses
"the power of the courts to entertain cases concerned with a certain subject,"
If
and does not authorize the courts to "mold substantive law." 5
prescriptive jurisdiction is the jurisdiction to make and apply conductregulating rules, and the ATS does not contain any conduct-regulating rules
but only provides jurisdiction for courts, it follows that a challenge to the
exercise of jurisdiction under the ATS challenges the only jurisdiction the

47 Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, No. 09-cv-1237, 2013 WL 4511354, at *6-7 (S.D. Tex.
Aug. 23, 2013), on reconsideration,994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014).
48 Giraldo v. Drummond Co.. No. 2:09-cv-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *8 (N.D. Ala.
July 25, 2013).
41 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732).
50
542 U.S. at 713-14; see also id. at 712 (stating that "the statute is in terms only
jurisdictional"); id. at 717 (comparing the ATS to other grants of original jurisdiction in the
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789).
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statute creates-judicial subject matter jurisdiction.
Compounding this view is that the conduct-regulating rules used in ATS
cases come from international, not national, law. As Kiobel explained, the
ATS "allows federal courts to recognize certain causes of action based on
sufficiently definite norms of international law." 51 Accordingly, the relevant
question is "whether the court has authority to recognize a cause of action
under U.S. law to enforce a norm of internationallaw."52 In short, the cause
of action comes from US law and the conduct-regulating norm comes from
international law. And because the conduct-regulating rule comes from
international law, it is already applicable in the foreign territory where the
conduct underlying the claim occurred (that is the whole point of
international law). In turn, there is no actual extraterritorial extension of US
law in the way there is an extraterritorial extension of, for example, US
securities or antitrust laws in foreign territories. Consequently, the entire
idea of a presumption against extraterritoriality regarding conduct-regulating
rules breaks down.
What does this mean for ATS cases going forward? The procedural
implications are fairly straightforward. As noted throughout the Essay,
judicial subject matter defects can be raised at any point during the course of
litigation, and may even be raised by courts sua sponte. 53 Unlike
that go to the merits, they are not subject
prescriptive jurisdiction challenges
54
raised.
timely
not
if
to waiver
The doctrinal implications are somewhat more difficult to tease out. A
helpful way to illustrate them is by contrasting two post-Kiobel approaches
to the Court's exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality for
ATS "claims [that] touch and concern the territory of the United States,...
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application." 55 The Second Circuit in Balintulo held that because all of the
conduct underlying the claims before it took place abroad, there was no
chance at all that the claims could touch and concern US territory so as to
qualify under the exception. 56 That the defendants were US citizens simply
had nothing to do with the exception because it dealt only with conduct,

"
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at 1666 (emphasis added).
Id.
See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
See id.
Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 (2d Cir. 2013) ("if all the relevant conduct
occurred abroad, that is simply the end of the matter under Kiobe?').

Post-KiobelProcedure

which allegedly occurred in foreign territory. 5 7 By contrast, the Fourth
Circuit in Al Shimari looked beyond the conduct to the "claims" terminology
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Kiobel and found that the terminology
embraced more than just conduct and included, inter alia: that the defendant
was as a US corporation, as were its employees who were alleged to have
committed the violations against the law of nations under the ATS; that the
contract by which the defendant performed the acts abroad was issued in the
United States by the Department of the Interior and that the contract required
defendants' employees to obtain security clearances from the US
Department of Defense; and that managers in the United States gave tacit
approval to the acts committed abroad, attempted to "cover up" the
misconduct, and "implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged" it. 58 According to
the Fourth Circuit,
the Supreme Court [in Kiobel] used the phrase "relevant conduct" to
frame its "touch and concern" inquiry, but never defined that term.
Under the facts presented, there was no need to do so because all the
conduct underlying the petitioners' claims occurred outside United
States territory. We also note that the Court broadly stated that the
"claims," rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must touch and
corcem United States territory with sufficient force, suggesting that
courts must consider all the facts that give rise to ATS claims,
including
the parties' identities and their relationship to the causes of
5
action.
In this connection, the Fourth Circuit also quoted Black's Law
Dictionary, which defines "claim" as ' the
"aggregate of operative facts giving
60
court."
a
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In our view, because Kiobel is really about subject matter jurisdiction,
the Fourth Circuit has the better approach. If Kiobel were about prescriptive
jurisdiction to regulate conduct, focusing exclusively on the conduct at
issue-as the Second Circuit did-would make sense. But Kiobel is about
the court's subject matter jurisdiction to entertain certain claims, and it
therefore makes more sense to evaluate "all the facts that give rise to ATS
claims, including the parties' identities and their relationship to the causes of
action."' 6 1 As one of us has argued elsewhere, to determine whether a case
"

See id. at 190-91.

58 Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., 758 F.3d 516, 528-29 (4th Cir. 2014)
59 Id. at 527-28.
60 Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed. 2009)).
See id.
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involving foreign elements qualifies for Kiobel's exception:
[the] inquiry does not ask only about conduct but instead asks
whether the claims touch and concern the United States .... This
makes sense because, once again, the ATS is a jurisdictionalstatute;
as such, it addresses claims, not conduct. And it would be consistent
with the lower court trend reading Kiobel's use of the presumption as
a subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry, not as a gauge for measuring
the reach of conduct-regulating rules. In other words, because
subject-matter jurisdiction deals with the viability of claims, it makes
sense to talk about
the relationship of claims, not just conduct, to the
62
United States.
CONCLUSION

This Essay evaluated whether ATS cases involving foreign elements
raise questions of prescriptive jurisdiction or subject matter jurisdiction after
the Supreme Court's decision in Kiobel. It concluded that the lower court
trend treats Kiobel as going to subject matter jurisdiction, and that this trend
is probably correct. It would have been helpful for the Supreme Court to
clearly provide guidance on this question-which has major doctrinal and
procedural consequences for the law and litigants.
The procedural
implications of viewing challenges based on Kiobel as going to judicial
subject matter jurisdiction are that such challenges can be raised at any time
during the course of litigation, including by the court sua sponte. The
doctrinal implications are that when evaluating whether Kiobel's exception
for "claims that touch and concern the territory of the United States, . ..with
sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
,. ,.,63
application,
courts should look not only to whether the conduct alleged
touches and concerns the United States, but instead to "all the facts that give
rise to ATS claims, including
the parties' identities and their relationship to
64
the causes of action."
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